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Abstract 
 
Image rights, broadly defined as the commercial appropriation of  
someone's personality, including indices of their image, voice, name and  
signature, have become increasingly important in the political economy of 
media sport. A range of legal, economic and political arguments have 
developed in the UK as to what image rights actually are, their legal 
efficacy and their potential impact on developments in the long-standing 
relationship between sport and the media. This paper focuses on the 
problematic definition of the term in the UK context and how it relates to 
certain economic and commercial transformations in British football. Using 
the English Premier League and the ʻcelebrity footballerʼ David Beckham 
as its primary focus, the paper traces the rise of image rights clauses in 
player contracts. This process is analysed in the context of rapid and 
dramatic change in the media coverage of the sport. The paper focuses 
on the growing legal complexities of protecting star images in relation to 
the Internet and the wider issues of football, fandom and popular culture.  
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Beckham, or at least, the commodified Beckham, has profited from the 
same kinds of processes that create kings from fools, luminaries from 
dullards, It Girls from underachieving nymphets. All have been delivered to 
a vast audience courtesy of a media with a seemingly inexhaustible 
appetite for celebrities. 
(Ellis Cashmore, 2002, p. 192) 
 
Introduction 
In the age of Beckham and Rooney, Ronaldo and Zidane, the attempt to 
commercially control both images and information around football has never 
been so great. For those players at the pinnacle of the sport the rewards of 
playing the professional game and the commercial trappings that accompany it 
are viewed as recognition that their worth is not purely born of how they play the 
game but also by their market value as a brand. As any economist will tell you, 
brands are notoriously difficult things to evaluate and are prone to fluctuations in 
the potency of their symbolic and capital worth (Thurlow & Jaworski, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the elite of the worldʼs footballers, the superstars of the game, are 
now traded on this intangible value with the capture of their so-called ʻimage 
rightsʼ central to any contractual negotiations between player, agents, club and 
national federation. 
 
This article intends to investigate the phenomenon of ʻimage rightsʼ from both a 
critical perspective on intellectual property and more broadly through a critique of 
the political economy of sport and the media; that inseparable couplet that 
presents a marker of contemporary culture and entertainment at the start of the 
Twenty First Century. As a consequence, what is at stake is the decay of a 
certain aspect of football as popular culture that has matured through the origins 
of spectator sport and its mediated spectacle into something that millions of 
people enjoy and connect with on various levels. In other words, it is increasingly 
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the case that significant sectors of football culture are being commodified through 
the enclosure of intellectual property rights, that encroach on areas of fandom 
and cultural practice that were once unrestrained or at least freer - in both senses 
of the word - than is currently the case. It is not that I would argue that things 
used to be better in the good old days, nor that sport stars should not enjoy the 
trappings of their successful careers. It is more that I fear that on economic 
grounds alone the football industry is in danger of killing the goose that laid the 
golden egg. As Morrow (2003) has documented, financial mismanagement by 
football clubs has seriously damaged the health of certain sectors of the 
professional sport in both England and Scotland largely due to exorbitant wage 
demands and an inability to keep a tight reign on the fiscal management of the 
game. The steady march to the hyper-commodification of sport has been 
happening for a long time and we should therefore not be surprised by its scale, 
predominantly expressed through the economic dependency of football and 
television (Boyle & Haynes, 2000 & 2004). Football needs television for the cash 
injection the rights of access to broadcast can bring. In negotiations over 
television rights contracts, broadcasters may well point to the public exposure 
they provide to the sport and the benefits such publicity affords. In the age of 
niche sports channels this argument loses some of its credibility. It is the 
economic rents football extracts from the relationship with television that 
underpins many of the strategic decisions made at the elite end of the 
professional game not the scale of its exposure. Television organisations need 
football for the ready-made audience and symbolic value it can bring to their 
channels in terms of ratings and subscriptions. These dual forces – the financial 
needs of football and the drawing power of football for broadcasters - represent 
the economic motivations behind the changes in elite professional football 
leagues around the world. Their consequences are deep seated and far 
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reaching, and in my focus on one aspect of these processes, the rise of player 
image rights, I am suggesting that the balance between football as an industry 
and its consumers (the fans) is increasing tilted toward the economic imperatives 
and greed of the gamesʼ elite clubs and players. 
 
The New Football Economy 
In this short space it is pretty difficult to provide a wholly accurate portrait of the 
macro-economic environment of English club football, but what is clear is that a 
small elite of clubs gain enormous benefits from their commercial operations, 
while the majority struggle for their very existence. Even within the Premier 
League the disparities are incredibly marked and the influx of foreign ownership 
of key clubs by international billionaires including Manchester United by the 
Glazer family, Liverpool by the Gillette family and Chelsea by Roman Abromovich 
reveal a telling disjuncture and imbalance of wealth in the English league 
structure. Many other English clubs, not as fortunate have gone in to 
administration or suffered the indignity of losing all their best players to help stave 
off creditors and the Inland Revenue. 
 
Both journalistic and academic investigations in to the financial management of 
the sport have reiterated the point that football at the elite end of the spectrum is 
so driven by commercial necessities and greed that outside the Premier League 
is an economic wasteland (Fynn & Guest, 1994 and 1999; Conn, 1998 and 2004; 
Conn et al, 2003; Dempsey & Reilly, 1998; Morrow, 1999 and 2003; Hamil et al, 
1999 and 2000; Banks, 2002; and Bower, 2003). It is commonly held that the 
intensification of football as a commodity began in the early 1990s following the 
first broadcasting contract between the newly formed Premier League and pay-
TV satellite broadcaster BSkyB. It might be argued, quite rightly, that the sport 
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has always had ties to commercial activity from its origins as a spectator sport. 
Indeed, it could be suggested that the sport has experienced significant spurts of 
commercial activity since the rise of the football superstar in the late-1960s and 
again with the arrival of shirt sponsorship during the early attempts to televise 
league matches live in the mid-1980s. But none of these processes have had 
quite such a dramatic impact and altered the economics of the game as much as 
the era of satellite and pay television. Put simply, the elite end of professional 
football in England has become a new commodity managed by a new business 
class. 
 
These economic changes went hand in hand with new pressures of governance 
of the professional game and the axis of power both within and beyond 
Premiership football involve some complex political relationships between clubs, 
the Premier League, the Football Association, the Football League and the 
international governing bodies UEFA and FIFA. Critics of the new era of 
commercialised football point to the distortion of wealth and power at the national 
(Manchester United, Chelsea and Arsenal) and supranational (the G14 group of 
European clubs) levels (see Williams, 1999, and Boyle & Haynes, 2004) and the 
associated corruption and political ineptitude that accompanies the market-
driven, free enterprise culture that pervades increasing levels of the game 
(Bower, 2003 and Thomas, 2003). Clubs and football administrators would point 
out that any economic or political crisis that the game endures is largely born of 
the most significant power-shift in the world game: from clubs to players. 
 
In an illuminating interview by Andrew Warshaw published on the FAʼs website 
the Chief Executive of UEFA, the Swede Lars-Christen Olsson, placed a 
significant emphasis on the destructive influence of what is more widely referred 
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to as ʻplayer powerʼ. Olssen made a plea for more solidarity in the game between 
the key stakeholders, stating: ʻWhatʼs terribly important is that football is bigger 
than any individual. When the key stars in European football disappear - whether 
they are players or officials - the game will survive. Thatʼs why we have a humble 
view of our own importanceʼ (Warshaw, 2004). Behind the assertion is the belief 
that elite clubs are setting a destructive economic agenda for the sport by paying 
inflated salaries in order to capture the leading talent in the game (the core 
value). Experiences at Lazio in Italy and Leeds United in England (where the 
dream of European football and commercial success prompted the clubs board to 
financially extend themselves well beyond their means) reveal not only the 
cavalier nature in the financial management of some football clubs but also the 
rapacious tendency to cave in to the demands of players and their agents only 
too willing to join an ʻaspirationalʼ elite that pay ʻtop-dollarʼ. Leeds United fans 
learnt the hard way when the club ended up with £100m of debt and no trophies 
in the cabinet to celebrate. One of its top earners Mark Viduka had been bought 
through a complex set of contractual negotiations that saw the playerʼs license – 
his right to play for Leeds united in the English Premier League - underwritten by 
an insurance company rather than the club. £20,000 of Vidukaʼs weekly wage of 
£70,000 was made up of payments for his image rights. Leeds ultimately became 
uncompetitive, lost all their talented players to pay off debt and lessen the wage 
burden and lost their Premier League status in 2004. Although extreme, an 
episode such as that involving Leeds United reveals the financial strain many 
clubs feel when trying to retain their international players and maintain their 
Premier League status. Innovative ways of paying player salaries has become a 
key practice of football accountancy and it is here that image rights come in to 
their own. 
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Players, contracts and image rights. 
The term image rights entered the consciousness of most British football fans in 
2000 when Real Madrid made their then world record signing of Portuguese 
midfielder Luis Figo from arch-rivals Barcelona. Crucial to the negotiations was 
the retention of Figoʼs image rights by the club enabling Real to exploit the 
players name and image on their merchandise and share in the profit from any 
personal endorsements the player might attain from sponsorship or advertising. If 
footballers were ever perceived as commodities this was surely it. Real went on 
to negotiate similar image rights deals with a number of their so-called 
ʻGallacticosʼ - Zidane, Ronaldo and most prominently David Beckham - to 
underline the centrality of exploiting licensing contracts above and beyond their 
success on the field. Research published in September 2004 revealed Real to 
have the largest fan base in the world, reaching an estimated half a billion fans in 
13 key ʻfootball marketsʼ (Soccer Investor, 2004). The key to this success is the 
combination of the Spanish clubs historic brand as supreme European 
champions with the global appeal of its many international stars. The sale of 
replica shirts dramatically boosted Realʼs turnover to €300m in 2003/04 and was 
mooted as the main reason for the transfer of David Beckham from Manchester 
United in July 2003 in an attempt to capture the fan market in South East Asia. 
As I shall discuss in more depth below, Beckhamʼs voracious exploitation of his 
image and the various contractual and intellectual property rights associated with 
it stands as an extreme case of the commodification of football. 
 
Less publicised image rights deals had also taken place in English club football. 
When Arsenal signed Denis Bergkamp from Inter Milan and David Platt from 
Sampdoria it enabled the club to include an image rights clause as part of their 
salaries. The key to the contracts was the ability for players to offset income tax 
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and national insurance payments through earning commercial income sourced 
outside the practice of playing football. The players personal-image-rights 
company would enter into contractual negotiations with the club for the 
exploitation of the rights. Rather than paying income tax on the proportion of their 
salaries gained from endorsements and other commercial activities the players 
would only be due to pay capital gains tax (at a much lower rate) on this income - 
a significantly diminished burden. Similarly, the club would not be due to pay any 
social security payments on payments for a players image rights. 
 
Bergkamp and Platt were able to exploit this tax loophole because they were 
previously domiciled outside the UK.  The practice was investigated by the Inland 
Revenue and the players were eventually taken to court. However, the judge 
ruled in favour of the players on the grounds that commercial revenue earned 
outside the UK is distinguishable from the core activity of their employment 
(namely playing football) and is not subject to UK income tax (Lewis et al, 2002). 
Following this ruling, many Premier League clubs instigated similar contractual 
deals with elite players and those signed from outside the UK. However, even 
players domiciled in the UK were able to develop image rights clauses by setting 
up investment trusts outside the UK - mainly in the Netherlands or the Republic 
of Ireland - where tax laws were more favorable. 
 
These practices are now well ingrained into the transfer and contractual 
negotiations of players at the elite end of the game. Where once players were 
obliged to simply appear in the annual club photograph, have their image 
reproduced for bubble gum cards or sticker albums and do the occasional public 
relations stint at the local supermarket, contemporary footballers are groomed 
and managed with an array of support staff including agents, publicists, financial 
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advisors and most importantly lawyers primed to exploit every available nook-
and-cranny of the football gravy train. In 2003 the Professional Footballers 
Association renewed its standard form agreement for players with Premier 
League clubs to include new regulations on image rights. Clubs were now 
obliged to include in their salaries specified payments for promotional and 
marketing activities undertaken by their players - whether they were megastars or 
not. The PFA have long claimed that players forego their performance rights in 
front of the TV cameras. Instead, the union levies a percentage of the income 
received by the Premier League, the FA and the Football League from television 
rights fees from all UK broadcasters. It is a mute point whether or not players 
could claim such performance rights under current copyright law in the UK 
(Arnold, 2002), but the threat of enforcing a ʻblackoutʼ in front of the cameras has 
certainly given the PFA a latent power in the negotiation over the levy of TV 
rights that enables the organisation to fund itself and underwrite player pensions 
and other benefits. The levy is born of the solidarity principle that all union 
members should be able to benefit from the funds and could be seen as one 
mechanism by which the money brought into the game by star players - through 
attracting inflated TV rights income - is redistributed to those in need. However, 
some players have investigated the possibility of exploiting broadcast rights for 
their own personal gain. When particularly important goals are replayed ad-
infinitum there has been a mounting argument for the player concerned (the 
scorer) to receive repeat fees for the rights to exploit their moment of magic (for 
example, Ryan Giggs pursued his performing rights over the repeated use of the 
footage of his FA Cup Semi-Final wining goal against Arsenal in 1999). It is 
argued that such uses are editorial. That is, they are not used in the context of 
the normal coverage of the game but are actually used to help promote the 
programmes or channels on which they are shown. Any solidarity principle would 
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appear to disappear if such a situation arose and the burden of paying for such 
additional rights would no doubt ultimately fall on viewers. 
 
The Enclosure of Football Image Rights 
Boyle (2003) has consistently argued in respect of media corporations and 
copyright that we are witnessing a kind of ʻenclosure movementʼ of informational 
goods and ideas based on an economic reasoning that argues that property 
rights provide control, maximise value and benefit those that become the 
guardians of the rights of access. In other words, the economic rhetoric behind 
intellectual property rights - its ideology - dictates the legal and technological 
environment in which the media now operate. In tandem with Boyleʼs critique I 
would argue that this process has also been prevalent in the sports industry, 
specifically at the intersection of sports stars, the media and promotional 
industries. For Boyle and others such as Lessig (2001), the enclosure movement 
is repressive because it closes down aspects of the commons - the public 
domain of free information and ideas - that used to be a valuable part of our 
popular culture. In football, commercial battles over the control and use of images 
are having a similar knock-on effect on the potential cultural creativity associated 
with the sport and its fandom. I shall expand upon this point shortly, but first it is 
important to understand how this enclosure has moved on apace in the past few 
years. 
 
Until recently English courts had been reluctant to recognise any rights in 
personality as a means of securing exclusive rights to commercially exploit the 
proprietary right in someoneʼs image, name, voice or likeness. Many stars have 
trade marks associated with their name - including BECKHAM and ROONEY - 
but such trade marks in peopleʼs names are limited in their range of products and 
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services they can cover (usually in categories x,y,z) and have been successfully 
challenged in the courts (for example Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc v Sid Shaw 
Elvisly Yours [1999]). 
 
Nevertheless, in 2002 case law gave a fillip to British celebrities in a judgment 
involving Formula One racing driver Eddie Irvine. Irvine claimed damages against 
the radio station Talksport (at the time called Talk Radio) after his image was 
illegitimately used in a promotional campaign by the commercial broadcaster. 
Talksport had doctored an unconnected photograph of Irvine by replacing the 
image of him holding a mobile phone with that of a radio with the tag line “Talk 
Radio… weʼve got it covered”. Irvine, clearly irked that he had not agreed to the 
use of his image, successfully sued for damages on the grounds of ʻfalse 
endorsementʼ: the argument that Talksport had deceived the viewers of the 
promotion that he had licensed the use of his image as a commercial 
endorsement of the product. Irvine succeeded under the tort of ʻpassing offʼ, the 
defence against his name and likeness as an unregistered trademark. In making 
the judgment the court effectively recognised for the first time in English law that 
famous sports stars had a commercial right to the exploitation of their image. The 
ruling also caused ripples across the sports law community as the realisation 
dawned that their clients - a host of elite sports celebrities - had legal support for 
the protection of their image rights, at least to a point. The Irvine case fell short of 
giving a prima facie right of publicity - as exists in the United States and some 
European nations - but the ruling was a warning shot across the bows of any 
media organisation or advertiser that sought to leverage any commercial value 
from sport stars. 
 
Similar cases confirmed the newly emerging recognition of image rights as a 
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category of legal protection, including an out of court settlement between former 
England cricket star Ian Botham and brewers of the Guinness brand Diageo after 
the brewers had used images of Bothamʼs heroic performance during the 1984 
Ashes series in one of their advertising campaigns. The threat of litigation 
following Irvineʼs intervention against Talksport had prompted the settlement, but 
it is certainly worthwhile questioning the motive of Botham and his advisors 
regarding any hold the player might have over archive footage. In copyright law it 
is the broadcaster that holds the rights to license secondary uses of the footage 
not the subject of the footage - in this case Botham. The fact that Bothamʼs legal 
team were able to force the hand of Diageo emphasises an important sea 
change in how media organisations and advertisers view their commercial 
position to sports stars.  
 
Legal precedents of this kind underpin the new regime of image rights in British 
football. This regime consists of an all-pervasive attitude among governing 
bodies, clubs, players and their agents that all - or certainly most - commercial 
and even non-commercial uses of images should be licensed and cleared 
accordingly. Such a legal enclosure of images potentially has some dramatic 
consequences for media, freedom of information and creativity in the new media 
age where production and consumption of digital images are increasingly blurred. 
It raises issues about football in the public domain as part of popular culture, and 
the rights of consumers and citizens. Examples of how this imbalance resides in 
the football industry now follows with an analysis of David Beckham and the 
management of his image rights. 
 
Policing the Image: The Case of David Beckham 
We have come to understand why footballers are paid handsomely - the ʻprune 
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juiceʼ effect of tapping in to the flow of income from television rights that flows all 
the way in to their (and their agentsʼ) bank accounts. We also understand that 
they can afford specialist legal support that will seek to use existing laws to their 
benefit, either through trademarks or ʻpassing offʼ. But what are the actual 
practices of footballers in their attempts to control their commercial worth as 
celebrities? The opportunities to exploit a star footballers name and image are 
now wider and more lucrative than ever before. This process is born of two 
interrelated aspects of contemporary sports stardom that combine the widening 
of symbolic capital of sports stars in industrialised capitalist cultures and the 
increasing economic capital in the global media sports industry.  How the 
symbolic world of culture links with the economic world of the sports industry is 
best explained through a specific example. Here I shall focus my attention on 
perhaps the exemplar of this process, the former Manchester United, Real 
Madrid and England footballer David Beckham. 
 
In his dissection of the celebrity status of Beckham, Cashmore (2002) remarks 
that athletes were once admired for their status as heroes, bestowed because of 
their deeds. Today, the cult of celebrity seems to operate outside of the talent on 
display. Instead, celebrity status and the trappings that go with it are ʻbestowed 
on them by othersʼ (Cashmore, 2002, p. 174). This is a trick of contemporary 
media culture that reveals the most intimate details of the stars to a knowing and 
sometimes cynical public. And yet, their fans hang on every word, every gesture, 
every consumable product that bares their name and image. We dream about 
being them, about being rich and famous, and being a celebrity, through 
consuming them. ʻThisʼ, Cashmore argues, ʻis why weʼre guided to celebrities, 
why the media produce more of them, and why the market commodifies themʼ 
(Cashmore, 2002, p. 194). This sounds a long way from football fandom as it is 
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traditionally conceived, but it explains why Real Madrid signed Beckham to 
capture his image rights to sell branded products to the 0.5 billion fans they 
reportedly have waiting in the wings, eager to snap up replica shirts and other 
merchandise and services. Beckham is an exceptional case in respect of image 
rights but the way in which his image has been commodified and its economic 
value policed is worth exploring a little further in this context. 
 
In March 2004 Beckham the footballer became Beckham the logo, or more 
correctly, his ʻtrade markʼ skill of scoring from free kicks was literally trade 
marked in a stylised logo of the player to accompany his range of branded 
merchandise for one of his main sponsors Adidas. The decision to use a 
dedicated logo for Beckham merchandise mirrored the characatured basketball 
player used by Nike in their long-standing and lucrative association with one of 
Beckhamʼs long time heroes Michael Jordan (indeed on signing for Real Madrid 
Beckham made much stock out of his request for the squad number 23, the 
number worn by Jordan). In launching the logo Beckham was cementing his 
contract with the sports manufacturer until 2008. A measure of just how important 
the dual branding of Adidas and Beckham had become was illustrated during the 
opening ceremony of the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester. Beckham 
was the central performer of the opening ceremony carrying a talismanic torch in 
to the stadium. However, in spite of the fact that the organisers had created a 
ʻcleanʼ stadium, with no perimeter advertising or sponsorship, Beckham entered 
the spotlight wearing a pristine white tracksuit with the word Adidas emblazoned 
across his chest in silver sequins. With 9 million viewers in the UK and many 
millions more watching worldwide Beckhamʼs PR stunt on behalf of his personal 
sponsor was both audacious and an epitome of the commodified athlete. 
The peculiarity that football does not figure in the Games epitomized the wider 
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appeal the organizers were trying to achieve from inviting Beckham – then still 
associated with Manchester – to open the event. 
 
In many ways this was the least we might have expected from Beckhamʼs iconic 
position in Britainʼs sports culture and wider cult of celebrity. The mediaʼs 
attention on Beckham the celebrity had begun in 1997 after his relationship with 
Spice Girl Victoria Adamʼs became public quarry, and the ʻPosh and Becksʼ 
narrative took hold of an ever-probing media industry and public gaze. As 
Cashmore makes clear, the pop starʼs experience of commercialising celebrity 
played a significant role in how Beckham and his advisors, particularly the agents 
SFX Sports part of the Clear Channel Communications group, dealt with his 
emerging fame. Lucrative endorsements followed with Pepsi, Police sunglasses, 
Rage computer games, Vodafone, Brylcream, Castrol Oil, Marks & Spencer and 
others alongside his central sponsorship contract with Adidas. All the above are 
global mega-brands, all cashing in on and adding to the players emerging 
celebrity. Many of these deals were renewed once the player moved to Real 
Madrid and dramatically increased in value. Beckhamʼs salary at Madrid, £4.6m 
included a 50% image rights clause that gave the club half of any new deals 
Beckham entered in to as a Madrid player. Shortly after Beckhamʼs signing 
Adidas reported a 350% rise in replica Madrid shirts with the name ʻBeckham 23ʼ 
emblazoned on the back. For Beckham, his personal wealth was aided further by 
new tax laws introduced by the conservative Spanish government providing 
exclusion for migrant workers from the highest band of tax at 45%; a boon for 
imported football stars. As I have already outlined, these commercial activities 
are viewed as separate from a players role as a footballer and in 2003 Beckham 
established Footwork Productions to operate as a holding company for his 
commercial operations based in Madrid. In its first year of operation the company 
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had a turnover of £8.7m with Beckham pocketing £6.7m from profits (Walsh, 
Campbell & Barnett, 2004) and at the end of 2006 Beckham was British footballʼs 
top earner by some margin with an estimated personal wealth of £87m compared 
to the second richest British footballer Michael Owen (at £32m) (BBC Sport, 
2007).  Interestingly, in terms of where this net value comes from, in 2006 
Beckham earned £4.4m from playing for Real Madrid and more than £19m from 
commercial endorsements. 
 
Beckhamʼs management of his media relations has also been impeccable. Again, 
lessons were probably learnt from his wife, in particular the way in which images 
of himself, his home and his family were released to the press. Exclusivity and 
controlled release of images has been the main way in which Beckham has 
leveraged revenue directly from the media. Rights to the Beckham's wedding in 
1999 were sold exclusively to OK magazine in a deal worth £1m who negotiated 
similar deals with the Beckhamʼs in their home and while on holiday in Barbados. 
Allegations that most photographʼs of the couple appearing in Britainʼs tabloid 
newspapers heralded from one source, paparazzi photographer Jason Fraser, 
led to allegations that the Beckhamʼs had entered an undisclosed deal with the 
photographer that meant he was given an exclusive ʻtip-offʼ of where the couple 
would be in readiness for a ʻstagedʼ but seemingly ʻsnatchedʼ set of photographs 
(Gibson, 2003). Even after the vilification he received after his sending off in the 
quarter final of the 1998 World Cup against Argentina, and the allegations of an 
affair with Rebecca Loos an employee of his then marketing agents SFX, 
Beckhamʼs acute sense of image and fostering of goodwill towards his celebrity 
has been impressive. The ʻLoos affairʼ prompted Beckham to cut his ties with the 
SFX agency that had done so much to foster his global brand. The departure 
from SFX reveals the ways in which contemporary celebrity footballers have to 
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strategically manage their public affairs and handle what Huw Beverley-Smith 
(2002) refers to as their ʻdignitary interestsʼ. Such interests - often referred to as 
issues of privacy - are related to their commercial interests through the 
interrelated ties with a celebrityʼs reputation. Interests in reputation are essentially 
non-pecunary (non-economic) but they clearly have a relationship with the 
publicity value of a footballers image. Ironically, damage to a players reputation 
could have a negative effect on the value of their formal endorsements, while at 
the same time increasing the value of their image, particularly at times of 
distress, to the popular press and celebrity magazines. Beckham has so far been 
particularly adept at handling both sides of the equation, but the way in which his 
life is writ large in a very public sense and how that is managed has been 
instructive to new talent, such as Wayne Rooney, entering the contemporary 
world of football as an entertainment industry. 
 
Beckham has not only been the exemplar of managing endorsement deals and 
public relations. Both he and his wife have vehemently policed the use of their 
name, likeness and image, challenging anyone or any organisation that dare 
contravene their status as valuable commodities. In 2003 amid early rumours that 
Beckham would be moving to Spain to join Real Madrid the low cost airline 
Easyjet used a photograph of the player with one of his many changing hairstyles 
with the tag line ʻHair today. Gone tomorrowʼ. Although the advert made no 
illusion that Beckham had endorsed the advert - which is clear from the 
humorous nature of the ad - Beckhamʼs agent SFX pressured the airline in to 
donating money to a charity of his choosing. Underlying the pressure was a 
threat to sue for possible false endorsement. The airline had a further run in with 
Beckham when they launched a second related campaign using the playersʼ 
image. Once again, the image of Beckham, styled with another hairstyle, 
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accompanied the tag line ʻNot sure where to go this summer? Barcelona? 
Madrid? Milan? Lowest fares to the hottest citiesʼ. Again, the advert made 
reference to the initial speculation as to Beckhamʼs future before he eventually 
signed for Madrid. Easyjetʼs behaviour flags up the insecure legal ground 
celebrities in the UK have to challenge the use of images by advertisers that are 
already in the public domain and that because of the humorous content implicitly 
communicate to the public that the star has not actually endorsed the product or 
service.  
 
In another episode, Victoria Beckham was alleged to have ʻgone mentalʼ in a 
souvenir shop in London where the pop star had spotted what she believed to be 
fake signed photographs of her husband on sale in the store. The encounter 
received wide coverage in the national press and led to considerable loss of 
trade for the shop owners Timothy and Glynis McManus. The couple filed a suit 
against Beckham claiming damages for slander. The case was heard in the high 
Court and Beckham was ordered to pay £88,000 in damages. Other instances of 
image and trademark policing of the Beckham brand have taken place on the 
global stage. A Russian company was threatened for using a look-a-like actor, 
clearly intended to be perceived as Beckham in an advert for cans of 
ʻManchester Ginʼ. The campaign was viewed as a clear case of passing off by 
the drinks manufacturer and Beckhamʼs new management company, 19, 
investigated the possibility of taking the matter to a Russian court under 
reciprocal agreements under the World Trade Organisations key multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property known as TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights). In his attempt to leverage his notoriety as a global 
brand, Beckham has registered his name as a trade mark in every territory 
around the world where such intellectual property laws exist. 
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In another much publicised legal action involving Beckhamʼs wife, Victoria tried to 
halt the registration of the word ʻPoshʼ by the football club Peterborough United. 
The club had commonly been known as ʻthe Poshʼ since the 1930s and in 1998 
had sought to register a trademark of its nickname for merchandising purposes. 
Victoria Beckham, also known to the public as ʻPosh Spiceʼ claimed that her 
moniker as Posh was far more ubiquitous and had more recognition among the 
UK population than the football clubs claim to its ʻbadge of originʼ. In January 
2004 Beckham eventually rescinded the allegations and admitted defeat, the 
clubs eighty-year history of trading under the name too entrenched to be 
overturned by Beckhamʼs more ephemeral status as a celebrity. 
 
In February 2007 Beckham signed a five-year deal with the US Major League 
Soccer franchise LA Galaxy reported to be worth $250m over five years, 
although the guaranteed income was much less at $6.5m per year (Lʼ Hote, 
2007). The move may prove apocryphal as the most blatant commercial transfer 
in the history of football. While some may argue that moving to the US would not 
undermine the players standing as a global footballing talent, many observers 
saw the move as a clear sign that Beckham the celebrity was now a far more 
potent symbol than Beckham the football player.  The transfer to Los Angeles 
was partially prompted by a breakdown in contractual negotiations at Real Madrid 
over the control of image rights. Beckham had sought assurances from 
Florentino Perez, the outgoing president of the club, that he would take complete 
ownership of any income from non-footballing related endorsements. This would 
have broken Madridʼs policy of dividing the commercial income of their 
ʻgalacticosʼ 50:50. 
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In moving to the US Beckham also moved into a legal environment where the 
economic worth of his media image is protected under the First Amendment 
ʻrights in publicityʼ and he has a proprietary right to own 100% of the commercial 
use of his image or name. Under MLS rules, the League contracts all players 
centrally and retains ownership of any rights connected with the League. The 
MLS pays a standard fee of $400,000 and the players club shoulders the cost of 
the remaining salary and bonuses. However, Los Angeles is arguably the global 
epicentre of celebrity culture and the Beckhamʼs move into the safe waters of 
Hollywood and media endorsements will enable him to grow his personal 
commercial deals and secure the players standing as one of the wealthiest 
sportsmen in the world. 
 
Conclusion 
The attempt by professional footballers to commercially control images and other 
information about soccer is happening at a time of expansion in the 
communication of all things related to the game. More broadly, legal critics such 
as Lessig (2001) have argued that innovations in new media are potentially being 
undermined by the enclosure of intellectual property rights.  Sport, most notably 
football, has been one of the most vociferous industries in protecting images, 
data and relevant commercial information from escaping in to the public domain. 
In my brief overview of contemporary practices in the English football industry it is 
clear that economic and legal issues are increasingly at the forefront of any 
communications connected with the sport. Awash with money from television 
rights and sponsors the gamesʼ position in popular culture and the relationship 
between players and clubs, players and fans, and clubs and fans have been 
redrawn. In the brief overview of David Beckhamʼs career as a celebrity and 
brand, we see a level of economic and legal intervention in the life of professional 
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footballers and their relationship with the media and their audience that is 
markedly changed from previous eras of the sport. At a time when new media 
networks such as the Internet offer promising avenues for fans to engage with 
the sport, through fan websites and specialised weblogs, the football industry and 
the intermediaries that provide the support systems now required to sustain its 
business (for example, lawyers, agents, financial advisors, publicists) 
increasingly view fans not as part of the spectacle but as consumers. One central 
aspect of fandom requires an engagement with media images of the object of 
their desire. The contemporary cult of celebrity that now surrounds football 
certainly fills this need. However, fandom is also about the appropriation of 
images and information to make new cultural meanings and produce new cultural 
artifacts. For example, when a young fan sets up a website in honour of their 
football hero or produces a mashup of famous goals for YouTube or MySpace 
they do not expect to find a legal writ on their doorstep disputing their right to 
have registered a domain name associated with the player or for having infringed 
copyright. However, this is increasingly a common occurrence as football clubs 
and players, bolstered by a new found legal remedy under World Intellectual 
Property Organisationʼs domain name arbitration procedures are used to force 
unsuspecting individuals who merely wanted to celebrate their fandom in a 
creative way. WIPOʼs arbitration service tends to favour the individual or 
organisation that holds a registered trademark and there have been a series of 
rulings that have reclaimed football related domain names back to players or their 
clubs. While some elements of ʻcybersquattingʼ  - the parasitical activity of 
extorting money from trade mark owners through the registration of related 
domain names - does exist and is rightly deemed an act of bad faith, it does not 
mean that all associations with a players name or club are for commercial gain or 
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of harm to their reputations. 
 
The images and names in sport are not merely economic assets to be exploited, 
but are embedded more generally in the cultures of sport. In the case I have 
argued above British soccer is seemingly rewriting its cultural contract between 
football and its fans. As footballers get sucked more and more into the media 
dominated entertainment industries this has primarily occurred along commercial 
lines protected by intellectual property law as it is in the film, television, music 
and associated industries. Ultimately, the economic imperatives of the football 
industry are generated from the core value of the sport, its new breed of football 
celebrities. As the market for all things related to football appears to grow 
exponentially – in television, sponsorship, advertising and merchandising – it 
may seem absurd to signal the symbolic ʻdeath of footballʼ. But as each crevice of 
football culture becomes commodified and commercialized the historic organic 
ties within sport between clubs, players and supporters that are at the root of 
multiple meanings in the game become strained. There is evidence of a new 
cynicism around football, not least by those who earn their living off the back of it. 
The Guardian sports journalist Will Buckley, author of a book entitled The Man 
Who Hated Football, summed up this rising sentiment regarding the over-baring 
nature of football in British popular culture when he suggested: “if everyone could 
start to take football a mite less seriously, there is a slim chance it might become 
a degree more joyous” (Buckley, 2004). But while football remains serious 
business, the joie-de-vivre associated with footballʼs wider social and cultural 
place in society will be increasingly challenged. 
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